## LOWER SICK LEAVE COVER, FEWER HEALTH-RELATED WORK ABSENCES? EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE

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## Résumé

Modulation of sick leave reimbursement scheme has often been used in attempt to reduce healthrelated absenteeism. We study the effects of the presence of a one-day waiting period for sick leave. This less generous policy was introduced in the French central civil service in January 2012 and repealed in January 2014, whereas the private sector was not affected. We employ a difference-indifferences strategy with individual fixed effects, using the French Labour Force Survey. We find that the total prevalence of health-related absences is not affected by the policy. However its duration distribution is. The prevalence of short-term absences decreases, while the prevalence of long-term absences increases. Decrease in short-term absences is higher for women, young employees and those working few days per week. Overall, we conclude that the policy failed to reduce absenteeism.

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